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Abstract
We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent
is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin
aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every agent, given the bundle allo-
cated to her, is aware that she does not envy at least one other agent, even if she does not
know how the other goods are distributed among other agents. We also introduce two of
its relaxations, and discuss their egalitarian guarantee and existence. Finally, we present a
polynomial-time algorithm, which computes an allocation that approximately satisfies MMA
or its relaxations. Interestingly, the returned allocation is also 1
2
-approximate EFX when all
agents have subadditive valuations, which improves the algorithm in [Plaut and Roughgarden,
SODA 2018].
1 Introduction
In the last few years or so, there has been a tremendous demand for fair division services to
provide systematic and fair ways of dividing a set of (indivisible) goods such as tasks, courses,
and properties among a group of agents so that the agents do not envy each other. Such demand
gave rise to, for examples, Spliddit1, the University of Pennsylvania’s Course Match2, and Fair
Outcomes, Inc3 which are all based on mathematical and fairness notions. To capture the fairness
of an allocation, which is arguably initiated by the work of [Foley, 1967], envy-freeness (EF) (and
its relaxations, such as EF1 and EFX) is often used to ensure that each agent should not envy or
prefer the allocated goods of other agents.
In this paper, we study an envy-free allocation domain where the planner of the division tasks
wishes to withhold allocation information of others from the user or the user simply does not know
the allocation of others in the system. There are a couple of good reasons why it is desirable for
1http://www.spliddit.org/
2https://mba-inside.wharton.upenn.edu/course-match/
3https://www.fairoutcomes.com/
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the planner to withhold such information. First, in many private fair allocations of goods such
as tasks or gifts, the planner requires the system to preserve anonymity as not to give away the
received bundles of other agents. Second, due to the large number of (unrelated) agents and items
that could be potentially be involved in the division tasks (e.g., on the Internet such as MTurks), it
is not meaningful for the planner to provide such information due to various reasons. Motivated
by this domain, we focus on answering the following questions.
When indivisible goods are to be allocated among unaware agents, what is the appropriate
envy-free notion and how efficiently can the allocation be found subject to the notion?
Proportionality (PROP) and maximin share (MMS) [Budish, 2011] are two widely studied and
well accepted fair allocation notions, both of which are defined for unaware agents. In PROP, it is
required that the value of every agent’s bundle is at least a 1
n
fraction of her value for the whole
goods, where n is the number of agents. It is well known that such an allocation may not exist
for indivisible goods, thus a weaker and more realistic notion is desired for indivisible goods.
MMS is a proper relaxation of PROP, which studies an adversarial situation: when the goods are
partitioned into bundles and an agent would always get the least preferred bundle of goods, what
is the best way she can partition the goods. The value of such a bundle is the MMS value of the
agent. In addition to its non-existence result, MMS allocation only guarantees each agent’s best
minimum value, and the value of some agent’s bundle can still be the least compared with others,
which may cause significant envy (demonstrated by the below example).
Example 1.1 Suppose there are 2 agents and 2 goods, v1({1}) = H , v1({2}) = 1 and v2({1}) =
1, v2({2}) = H , where H is a sufficiently large number and v1 and v2 are valuation functions.
Then each agent’s MMS value is 1 and A1 = {2}, A2 = {1} is an MMS allocation, but each agent
envies each other. However, if we exchange their allocations, everyone’s value can be improved to
H .
Recently, [Aziz et al., 2018] introduced epistemic envy-free (EEF) notion to study unaware
setting. With respect to EEF, each agent is satisfied if there exists one reallocation of the goods
that she does not get among the other agents, such that her value for her bundle is at least as good
as every bundle in this reallocation. This measure is not robust if the reallocations are restricted
by agent’s reasoning (e.g., adversarial settings in MMS). Moreover, it can be shown that EEF and
PROP allocations (and their relaxations) barely exist and cannot be properly approximated4 .
Our Contributions. In this paper, we focus on modeling the envy-freeness for indivisible goods
allocation as well as deriving new algorithms to find (approximately) fair allocations subject to dif-
ferent fairness notions in an unaware environment. Our main contributions include the following.
First, we introduce a novel fairness notion of maximin aware (MMA), which guarantees that
the agent’s bundle value is at least as much as her value for some other agent’s bundle, no mat-
ter how the remaining goods are distributed, i.e., there is always somebody who gets no more
than her. MMA combines the notion of epistemic envy-freeness [Aziz et al., 2018] and MMS
[Budish, 2011] where each agent may not know or care about the exact allocation of the remain-
ing goods to other agents, but can still guarantee that the value for her own bundle is at least as
4Consider three agents with two goods such that every agent has value 1 for each good. Then the agent that receives
no good has no bounded guarantee for both PROP and EEF (and their relaxations by removing any item from the items
she has not obtained).
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much as she can obtain if she is given the chance to repartition the remaining goods and receive the
least valued portion. We provide a detailed picture of the relationship between MMA and classic
fairness notions for different valuations.
Then we showMMA is a strong requirement and cannot be guaranteed in general, and provide
two relaxations of MMA: MMA1 and MMAX. We also prove that MMA1 (and MMAX) poten-
tially has stronger egalitarian guarantee than EF1 and such an allocation is guaranteed to exist for
the following situations: (1) there are at most three agents with submodular valuations and (2)
there are any number of agents but all of them have identical submodular valuation. If the above
requirement of submodularity is replaced by strictly increasing subadditivity, an MMAX alloca-
tion is guaranteed to exist. In contrast, MMS allocation may not exist even for three agents with
additive valuations [Kurokawa et al., 2018] and an EFX allocation is only known to exist when
there are two agents [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an allocation such that every agent is
either 12 -approximate MMA or exactly MMAX for additive valuations. For several specific classes
of valuations, such as binary additive or additive with identical preference ranking, our algorithm
returns an exact MMAX and EFX allocation. It is shown in [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] that
a 12 -approximate EFX allocation exists for general subadditive valuations, but finding it may need
exponential time, which leaves an open question whether such an allocation can be found in poly-
nomial time. We show that the allocation by our algorithm computes is also 12 -approximate EFX
when all agents have subadditive valuations, and thus answer this problem affirmatively.
Our Approaches. To show the existence of MMA1 allocations, we first show that if all n agents
have identical submodular valuations, a leximin n-partition of the goods is MMA1. Next, we
provide a divide-and-choose style algorithm for 3 agents with submodular valuations (need not to
be identical). Basically, we let the first agent make a leximin 3-partition, and other 2 agents select.
Then no matter which subset is left for the first agent, she is satisfied with respect to MMA1.
However, the difficulty comes from how the other 2 agents should select. By carefully examining
all possible cases, we show that there is a way to select and redivide the three subsets such that
both of them are satisfied with respect to MMA1.
To design an efficient algorithm for MMAX or EFX allocations, we construct a bipartite graph
between agents and goods. We show that there is a way to use a maximum weighted matching
between the unenvied agents and the remaining goods to guide our allocation. Eventually, we
show that all the goods are allocated, and the final allocation is either 12 -approximate MMA or
exact MMAX for additive valuations and 12 -approximate EFX for subadditive valuations.
Other Related Works. For indivisible goods allocations, EF or PROP allocations may not al-
ways exist5. [Budish, 2011] introduced the relaxed concept of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1).
In an EF1 allocation, it is only required that each agent’s value for a bundle is at least as much
as her value for every other agent’s bundle minus a single good (in the bundle). It is shown in
[Lipton et al., 2004] that an EF1 allocation always exists, and can be found in polynomial time.
In [Caragiannis et al., 2016], the authors introduced a strictly stronger fairness notation than EF1
called envy-free up to any good (EFX), where the comparison is made to “any” single good in-
stead of “a” single good. The state-of-the-art results show that an EFX allocation exists in the
5For example, there are two agents but only one good.
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following settings: (1) there are 2 agents, or (2) there are any number of agents but all of them
have the identical valuation [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. It is still an open question whether
an EFX allocation exists in general, even for additive valuations.
Recently, we see many new fairness notions adapted for different settings, such as Nash so-
cial welfare [Caragiannis et al., 2016], epistemic envy-freeness [Aziz et al., 2018], pairwise max-
imin share [Caragiannis et al., 2016], and groupwise maximin share [Barman et al., 2018]. There
is also a line of works making connections (or constraints) of fair allocations to graphs or net-
works [Abebe et al., 2017, Bei et al., 2017, Aziz et al., 2018]. More works on the fair allocation
problem under different constraints can be found in [Ferraioli et al., 2014, Bouveret et al., 2017,
Biswas and Barman, 2018].
Organization. We provide necessary definitions and introduce MMA in Section 2. We show
its connections with classic fairness notions for different classes of valuations in Sections 3. In
Sections 4 and 5, we study the two relaxations of MMA, MMA1 and MMAX, and discuss their
connections with other fairness notions and their existences in different settings. Finally, in Section
6, we present a polynomial time algorithm to compute a 12 -approximate MMAX allocation for
additive valuations; and 12 -approximate EFX allocation for subadditive valuations.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
In the envy-free division problem on indivisible goods, there is a set N = {1, ..., n} of n agents
and a set M = {1, ...,m} of m indivisible goods. Each agent i ∈ N has an valuation function
vi : 2
N → R≥0 that maps every subset of goods to a non-negative real number. We assume that vi
is normalized (i.e., vi(∅) = 0) and montone (i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆ M ) for each
agent i ∈ N . For convenience we use v(j) to denote v({j}), for every valuation v and every good
j ∈M . Throughout the whole paper, we call an valuation v
1. additive if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v(j) for each S ⊆M ;
2. binary additive (BA) if v is additive, and v(j) ∈ {0, 1} for any good j;
3. subadditive (SA) if v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for any S, T ⊆M ;
4. submodular (SM) if for any S ⊆ T and e ∈M \T , v(S∪{e})−v(S) ≥ v(T ∪{e})−v(T ).
An allocation A = (A1, ..., An) = (Ai)i∈N is a partition of M among agents in N , i.e.,⋃
i∈N Ai = M and Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for any i 6= j. In other words, Ai is the set of goods allocated to
agent i. Let A−i = ∪j 6=iAj be the goods not assigned to agent i. Without loss of generality, we
assume that for every j ∈M , there exists i ∈ N such that vi(j) > 0.
Below we state some standard fairness definitions.
Definition 2.1 (EF) For any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-envy-free (α-EF) if for any i, j ∈ N ,
vi(Ai) ≥ α · vi(Aj). The allocation is EF when α = 1.
Definition 2.2 (EF1) For any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-EF1 if for any i, j ∈ N , there exists
e ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ α · vi(Aj\{e}). The allocation is EF1 when α = 1.
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Definition 2.3 (EFX) For any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-EFX if for any i, j ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥
α · vi(Aj\{e}) for any e ∈ Aj . The allocation is EFX when α = 1.
Next, we introduce another fairness notion called maximin share (MMS). Let Πn(S) be the
set of all n-partitions of a set S. The maximin share of agent i on S among n players is
MMSi(S, n) = max
pi∈Πn(S)
min
S∈pi
vi(S).
Definition 2.4 (MMS) For any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-MMS if for any i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥
α ·MMSi(M,n). The allocation is MMS when α = 1.
Next we define the epistemic envy-free (EEF) [Aziz et al., 2018], which is the most relevant
fairness notion to this work.
Definition 2.5 (EEF) An allocation A is EEF if for any i, there exists an allocation A¯i = (A¯ij)j∈N
such that A¯ii = Ai and vi(Ai) ≥ vi(A¯
i
j) for any j ∈ N .
For the purpose of presenting our results, we provide the definition of proportionality fairness.
Definition 2.6 (PROP) An allocation A is PROP if for any i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥
1
n
· vi(M).
Finally, we say that X
type
==⇒ Y if every X allocation is also a Y allocation when agents have
type valuations, where X and Y are the fairness notions (e.g., MMA1 and MMS) and type is the
function type (e.g. SA and SM).
3 Maximin-Aware Allocation
In this section, we introduce the fairness notion of maximin-aware (MMA), and study its connec-
tion to other existing fairness notations.
Definition 3.1 (MMA) For any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-MMA if for any agent i ∈ N ,
vi(Ai) ≥ α ·MMSi(A−i, n − 1). The allocation is MMA when α = 1.
There is a modeling and conceptual advantages of MMA: an MMA allocation guarantees for
every agent, no matter how the goods that she does not get are distributed among the other agents,
there is always an agent who gets no more than her. Compared to EEF, where the happiness of
each each agent depends on the existence of a reallocation of the other goods, MMA provides a
robust way for the agents to reason about their reallocations of the remaining goods.
Observe that an MMS allocation need not be MMA. Recall, Example 1.1 where A1 = {2}
and A2 = {1} is an MMS allocation. However, this allocation is far from being MMA since
v1(A1)≪ v1(A2) and v2(A2)≪ v2(A1). The only MMA allocation in this example is A1 = {1}
and A2 = {2}.
Seemingly MMA being a stronger definition than MMS, Example 3.1 shows that this is not
true.
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Example 3.1 Suppose there are four agents (N = {1, 2, 3, 4}) and eight goods (M = {1, 2, · · · , 8}).
Agent 1 has the additive valuation shown in Table 1.6 It is easy to check that MMS1(M, 4) = 0.5.
Let S = {5, 6, 7, 8}. Then v1(S) = 0.4 < MMS1(M, 4). That is, for agent 1, S does not satisfy
the condition of MMS . However, MMS1(M \ S, 3) = 0.4 = v1(S), which satisfies the condition
of MMA.
Goods 1 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8
Value 1 0.4 0.1
Table 1: MMA does not imply MMS in general.
However, when all agents have binary additive (BA) valuations, MMA actually implies MMS.
Lemma 3.1 MMA
BA
==⇒ MMS.
Proof: Fix any agent i ∈ N , let mi = vi(M) be the number of goods agent i is interested in.
Then MMSi(M,n) = ki = ⌊
mi
n
⌋. Fix any MMA allocation A, we show that it is also MMS.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., vi(Ai) < ki. Then we have
MMSi(A−i, n− 1) = ⌊
mi − vi(Ai)
n− 1
⌋ ≥ ⌊
mi −
mi
n
n− 1
⌋ ≥ ki,
which contradicts the fact that A is MMA. Hence A is also an MMS allocation. 
Indeed, similar to MMS, MMA is a more realistic and appropriate definition for indivisible
goods allocation, in the sense that MMA is more approachable than EF and PROP for addi-
tive valuations. In the following, we show that PROP
A
=⇒ MMA. Combining with Theorem 4
of [Aziz et al., 2018], it implies EF
A
=⇒ EEF
A
=⇒ PROP
A
=⇒MMA.
Lemma 3.2 EF
A
=⇒ EEF
A
=⇒ PROP
A
=⇒ MMA
Proof: Fix any PROP allocation A and any agent i. It follows that vi(Ai) ≥
1
n
· vi(M). Since the
valuations are additive,
MMSi(M \Ai, n− 1) ≤
1
n− 1
· (1−
1
n
) · vi(M) =
vi(M)
n
.
Hence, the allocation is also MMA. 
Note that the other direction is not true: in Example 3.1, agent 1 is satisfied with S =
{5, 6, 7, 8} with respect to MMA, but the portion is only 0.42.6 < 0.25. On the other hand, MMA
is still a strong requirement for indivisible goods allocation, in the sense that it cannot be satisfied
even in some simple settings.
6We do not explicitly describe the valuations for the other agents since it is easy to design other agents’ valuations
such that S is allocated to agent 1.
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Lemma 3.3 MMA allocations may not exist even when the agents have identical BA valuation.
Proof: Assume there are n agents and m = kn − 1 goods, where k > 1. Each agent’s value on
every good is 1. For any agent i, if she gets |Ai| ≤ k − 1 goods then
MMSi(A−i, n− 1) =⌊
kn− 1− |Ai|
n− 1
⌋
=⌊k +
k − 1− |Ai|
n− 1
⌋ ≥ k > |Ai|.
Thus in any MMA allocation, we have |Ai| ≥ k for every agent i, which is impossible with kn−1
goods in total. 
In the following two sections, we introduce two relaxations of MMA based on EF1 and EFX,
respectively.
4 Maximin-Aware up to One Good
In this section, we relax the MMA notion to maximin-aware up to one good (MMA1) that is
analogous to EF1.
Definition 4.1 (MMA1) Fix any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-MMA1 if for any i, there exists
e ∈ A−i such that
vi(Ai) ≥ α ·MMSi(A−i\{e}, n − 1).
The allocation is MMA1 when α = 1.
4.1 Connection to EF1 and MMS
We first note that while MMA1 is a relaxed version of MMA, it may have better egalitarian guar-
antee than EF1 allocations. An MMA1 allocation A guarantees that for each agent i and her
favorite item e ∈ A−i (assume e ∈ Ak), vi(Ai) is at least as large as the worst bundle in any
(n − 1)-partition of A−i \ {e}. However, EF1 implies that there exists an (n − 1)-partition of
A−i \{e}, i.e., Ai′ for i
′ 6= k and Ak \{e}, such that vi(Ai) is at least as large as the worst bundle,
i.e. Ak \ {e}. We illustrate this as the following example.
Example 4.1 Consider n+ 1 agents and 2n+ 1 goods, where every agent has identical additive
valuation v with v({j}) = n for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and v({j}) = 1 for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n + 1. Thus
allocation Ai = {i, n + i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and An+1 = {2n + 1} is EF1. In such an allocation,
agent n + 1 only gets value 1. However, there is an allocation (for example: Ai = {i} for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and An+1 = {n+ 1, · · · , 2n + 1}) where everyone obtains value at least n.
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In Example 4.1, an EF1 allocation can be arbitrarily bad to agent n + 1. However, we show
that any MMA1 allocation A in this example guarantees that each agent’s value is at least ⌈n2 ⌉. If
everyone’s value is at least n, then our claim trivially holds. Suppose for some agent i, v(Ai) =
7We note that there is no exact EF allocation for this example.
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k < n. Then among all goods in A−i, there are n goods with value n and n + 1 − k goods with
value 1. Thus by removing the most favorite good, the maximin share for the remaining set is
min{n, n + 1 − k}. Since A is an MMA1 allocation, v(Ai) = k ≥ n + 1 − k, which means
v(Ai) ≥ ⌈
n
2 ⌉.
In the following, we show that MMS implies MMA1 when the agents’s valuations are sub-
modular.
Lemma 4.1 MMS
SM
==⇒ MMA1.
Proof: Let A be an MMS allocation. It follows that vi(Ai) ≥ MMSi(M,n) for every agent i. Fix
any agent i ∈ N , it suffices to show that there exists e ∈ A−i such that vi(Ai) ≥ MMS(A−i \
{e}, n − 1).
If for every e ∈ A−1, vi(Ai ∪ {e}) = vi(Ai), then by the submodularity of v, we have
vi(M) ≤ vi(Ai) +
∑
e∈A−i
(vi(Ai ∪ {e}) − vi(Ai)) = vi(Ai),
where the inequality holds since the marginal contribution of each good does not increase. Thus
A is also an MMA1 allocation for agent i.
Otherwise, let e ∈ A−i be such that vi(Ai ∪ {e}) > vi(Ai). For the sack of contradiction,
suppose there exists a partition B = (Bj)j∈N\{i} of A−i \ {e} such that vi(Bj) > vi(Ai) for
all j ∈ N \ {i}. Then if we include e into Ai, the resulting partition of M (into n parts) has
minimum value strictly larger than MMSi(M,n) on every agent, which contradicts the definition
of MMSi(M,n). 
By a similar argument, every α-MMS allocation is naturally α-MMA1. Recall Example 3.1
where we show an MMA allocation is not necessarily MMS (thus neither an MMA1 allocation),
this implication is strict.
Next, we show that for binary additive valuations, MMA1 and MMS are actually equivalent.
Lemma 4.2 MMA1
BA
⇐⇒MMS.
Proof: Since binary additive functions are submodular, it suffices to prove the ”⇒” direction.
Fix any MMA1 allocation A = (Ai)i∈N , we prove that vi(Ai) ≥ ki for every agent i, where
ki = MMSi(M,n) = ⌊
vi(M)
n
⌋.
Fix any agent i and assume the contrary that vi(Ai) < ki. Let mi = vi(M). Then for any
e ∈ A−i we have
MMSi(A−i \ {e}, n − 1) = ⌊
mi − 1− vi(Ai)
n− 1
⌋
≥⌊
mi − 1− ki + 1
n− 1
⌋ ≥ ki > vi(Ai),
which contradicts the fact that A is MMA1. 
Recall that in Lemma 3.1, we prove that MMA
BA
==⇒ MMS, which is actually implied by
Lemma 4.2, since MMA⇒MMA1, for any valuations.
It is shown in [Kurokawa et al., 2018] that even for three agents with additive valuations, MMS
allocations do not always exist. As we will show later, for a broader class of situations, an MMA1
allocation is guaranteed to exist.
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4.2 The Existence of MMA1 Allocations
By Lemma 4.2, we know that an MMA1 allocation always exists when the valuations are bi-
nary additive. In this section, we explore the existence of MMA1 allocations for instances with
subadditive valuations.
Leximin n-partition. First, for any valuation v over a set M of goods, we define the leximin
n-partition as follows. A leximin n-partition is a partition which divides M into n subsets and
maximizes the lexicographical order when the values of the partitions are sorted in non-decreasing
order. In other words, a leximin n-partition maximizes the minimum value over all possible n-
partitions, and if there is a tie it selects the one maximizing the second minimum value, and so
on.
In the following, we show that MMA1 allocations exist when all agents have identical sub-
modular valuation, or when there are three agents with (different) submodular valuations.
Identical submodular valuation. We first show that when all agents have identical submodular
valuation, the leximin n-partition ofM is indeed an MMA1 allocation.
Theorem 4.1 When all agents have the identical submodular valuation, the leximin n-partition
ofM is MMA1.
Proof: Let v be the submodular valuation and A be the leximin n-partition of M . We show that
allocating each partition Ai to agent i gives an MMA1 allocation. As before, if for all e ∈ A−i,
v(Ai ∪ {e}) = v(Ai), then we have
v(Ai) = v(M) ≥ MMS(A−i, n − 1)
by submodularity of v. Otherwise let e ∈ A−i be any good such that v(Ai ∪ {e}) > v(Ai).
Assume the contrary that v(Ai) < MMS(A−i \ {e}, n − 1).
LetB = (Bj)j∈N\{i} be the partition ofA−i\{e} such that v(Ai) < v(Bj) for all j 6= i. Then
by including e into Ai, we obtain a partition ofM such that every bundle has value strictly larger
than v(Ai). In other words, the resulting partition is strictly better than the leximin n-partition,
which is a contradiction. 
Three agents with different submodular valuations. Next we show a divide-and-choose style
algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) which gives an MMA1 allocation.
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Algorithm 1 Divide-and-Choose Algorithm for Three Agents
1. Agent 3 dividesM as a leximin partition, which is denoted by A = (A1, A2, A3).
2. If agent 1’s and agent 2’s favorite bundles are different, each of them takes her favorite
bundle and the remaining bundle is allocated to agent 3.
3. Otherwise (agent 1 and agent 2 have the same favorite bundle), we compare their second
favorite bundle. If their second favorite bundles are also the same, agent 2 takes her favorite
two bundles (w.o.l.g, say A1 and A2), and leaves A3 to agent 3. Next, agent 2 repartitions
A1 ∪ A2 by her leximin 2-partitions, denoted by B1 and B2. Agent 1 chooses her favorite
one in B1 and B2, and the other one is allocated to agent 2.
4. Finally, suppose their second favorite bundles are different. W.o.l.g, suppose v1(A1) ≥
v1(A2) ≥ v1(A3) and v2(A1) ≥ v2(A3) ≥ v2(A2).
(a) If 2 · v1(A2) > v1(A1) + v1(A3) and 2 · v2(A3) > v2(A1) + v2(A2), allocate A2 to
agent 1, A3 to agent 2 and A1 to agent 3.
(b) Otherwise (assume w.l.o.g. that 2 · v1(A2) ≤ v1(A1) + v1(A3)). Agent 2 takes A1
and A3, which are her favorite two bundles, and leave A2 to agent 3. Next, agent 2
repartitions A1 ∪A3 by her leximin 2-partition C = (C1, C2), and let Agent 1 choose
her favorite one in C1 and C2. The other one is allocated to agent 2.
Theorem 4.2 When n = 3 and the valuations are submodular, Algorithm 1 computes an MMA1
allocation.
Proof: First, observe that since (A1, A2, A3) is a leximin n-partition of agent 3, and she always
gets one of A1, A2 and A3, by Theorem 4.1, she is satisfied with respect to MMA1.
Next, we consider agents 1 and 2.
If the final allocation is from Case (2), i.e., both of them get their favorite bundles, then they
are satisfied with respect to MMA1, given that the valuations are submodular.
If the final allocation is from Case (3), i.e., agent 2 repartitions A1 and A2, the favorite two
bundles of both agents, and let agent 1 choose first, then we show that both agents are satisfied
with respect to MMA1. First, Agent 1 will always be happy, since the bundle she chooses must
have value at least 13 ·v1(M), by submodularity of v1. For agent 2, by leximin partitioning A1∪A2
into B1 and B2 (suppose v2(B1) ≤ v2(B2)), we have v2(B2) ≥
1
3 · v2(M). Thus if B2 is left for
agent 2, she will be satisfied. Otherwise agent 2 gets B1, which satisfies v2(B1) ≥ v2(A3), since
agent 2 is still able to leave A1 and A2 unchanged. Observe that there must exist some e ∈ B2,
such that v2(B1 ∪ {e}) > v2(B1), as otherwise v2(B1) = v2(B1 ∪ B2), which is impossible.
Moreover, we have v2(B1) ≥ v2(B2\{e}), otherwise B1 and B2 is not a leximin partition. Thus
v2(B1) ≥
1
2 ·v2(A3∪B2\{e}), which implies that agent 2 is also satisfied with respect to MMA1.
If the final allocation is from Case (4a), agent 1 and agent 2 get a bundle with value at least
1
3v1(M) and
1
3v2(M), respectively. Thus they are both satisfied.
If the final allocation is from Case (4b), i.e., agent 2 takes away her favorite two bundles A1
and A3 and leximin-partitions them, then similar to Case 3, no matter which one is left for her, she
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will be satisfied. Note that for agent 1, since v1(A1) + v1(A3) ≥ 2 · v1(A2), the bundle she gets
has value at least 12 · v1(A1 ∪A3) ≥
1
3 · v1(M). Thus agent 1 is also satisfied. 
Remark. We note that when there are two agents and both of them have subadditive valuations
(do not need to be identical), the definition of MMA1 degenerates to be EF1. Thus an MMA1
allocation always exists. Indeed, using approaches similar to Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we can show
that a leximin allocation is an MMA1 allocation if (1) all agents have identical strictly increasing
subadditive valuations, or (2) there are three agents with (different) strictly increasing subadditive
valuations. We say that a subadditive function v is strictly increasing if v(S ∪ {e}) > v(S) for
any e /∈ S.
5 Maximin-Aware up to Any Good
First, we define MMAX as follows.
Definition 5.1 (MMAX) Fix any α ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A is α-MMAX if for any i,
vi(Ai) ≥ α ·MMSi(A−i \ {e}, n − 1)
for any e ∈ A−i. The allocation is MMAX when α = 1.
We first note that MMAX allocations give an even better egalitarian guarantee than MMA1
and EF1 allocations. Recall Example 4.1, where we show there is an EF1 allocation such that
some agent only gets value 1 and any MMA1 allocation guarantees each agent’s value is at least
⌈n2 ⌉. It is not difficult to show that any MMAX allocation guarantees each agent’s value is at least
n.
Obviously, an MMAX allocation is also MMA1. Together with Lemma 4.2, we have
MMAX
BA
==⇒MMA1
BA
⇐⇒MMS.
However, beyond BA valuations, the above implication does not hold. We can see this by borrow-
ing an example from [Kurokawa et al., 2018], for which there is no MMS allocation, but MMAX
(and thus MMA1) allocations do exist.
Example 5.1 Consider the following example with 4 agents with additive valuations on 14 goods,
where agent 1 and 2 have valuation shown in matrix P , while valuation of agent 3 and 4 are shown
in matrixQ. The goods correspond to the non-zero elements in P andQ. Here ǫ is a small number;
say 1
210
and ǫ˜ is an even smaller number compared with ǫ; say 1
2100
. Partitioning the goods based
on the rows gives an MMAX (and MMA1) allocation A. Note that in A, every agent i gets a value
of at least 1− ǫˆ and the least favorite good in A−i values at least ǫ
4 to her. Then by removing the
least favorite good, the proportional value is at most 13 · (3 + ǫ˜ − ǫ
4) (the total value of goods is
4), which is no more than 1− ǫˆ. Thus vi(Ai) ≥ MMSi(A \ {e}, 3) for any e ∈ A−i and i ∈ N .
On the other hand, it is easy to check that MMSi(A, 4) = 1 for all agent i. However, by
enumerating all possible allocations, one can check that there does not exist any allocation that
guarantees a bundle of value at least 1 for every agent.
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P =


7
8 ǫ
4 0 18 − ǫ
4 − ǫ˜
ǫ3 34 −ǫ
3 + ǫ2 14 − ǫ
2 − ǫ˜
0 −ǫ4 + ǫ 12
1
2 + ǫ
4 − ǫ− ǫ˜
1
8 − ǫ
3 1
4 − ǫ
1
2 + ǫ
3 − ǫ2 18 + ǫ
2 + ǫ+ 3ǫ˜


Q =


7
8 ǫ
4 0 18 − ǫ
4
ǫ3 34 −ǫ
3 + ǫ2 14 − ǫ
2
0 −ǫ4 + ǫ 12
1
2 + ǫ
4 − ǫ
1
8 − ǫ
3 − ǫ˜ 14 − ǫ− ǫ˜
1
2 + ǫ
3 − ǫ2 − ǫ˜ 18 + ǫ
2 + ǫ+ 3ǫ˜


Next we show the connection between MMAX and EFX when the valuations are binary addi-
tive.
Lemma 5.1 EFX
BA
==⇒MMAX.
Proof: LetA be any EFX allocation. Consider any agent i ∈ N and let x = vi(Ai) be the value of
i’s bundle under the allocation A. Since A is EFX, then for any j ∈ N \ {i}, one of the following
statements holds:
1. vi(Aj) = x+ 1 and |Aj | = x+ 1 (i.e., agent i has value 1 for every good in Aj);
2. vi(Aj) ≤ x (i.e., Aj may contain more than x + 1 goods, but agent i has value 1 for exact
x goods).
This is because if both of them do not hold, then vi(Aj) ≥ x+ 1 and |Aj | > x+ 1, which means
agent i has value 0 for at least one good in Aj . Thus agent i still envies agent j after removing the
good with value 0 from Aj .
Note that as long as there exists an agent j 6= i such that vi(Aj) ≤ x, then vi(A−i) ≤
(x+ 1)(n − 1)− 1. Hence
MMSi(A−i, n− 1) ≤ x = vi(Ai).
Otherwise we have vi(A−i) = |A−i| = (x+1)(n− 1). Then by removing any good e ∈ A−i, we
have
MMSi(A−i \ {e}, n − 1) ≤ x = vi(Ai).
In both case, agent i is satisfied with respect to MMAX. 
However, when agents have general additive valuations, EFX does not imply MMAX. More
specifically, for the following example with additive valuations, an EFX allocation exists but is
not MMAX.
Example 5.2 Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} andM = {1, 2, · · · , 7}. Agent 1 has the additive valuation
shown in Table 2. It is easy to check that A1 = {1}, A2 = {2, 4}, A3 = {3, 5, 6, 7} is an EFX
allocation to agent 1. But this is not MMAX to her. Consider the following partition of A−1 \{7}:
B2 = {2, 6}, B3 = {3, 4, 5}. Then v1(B2) = v1(B3) = 1.2, which are strictly larger than
v1(A1).
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Goods 1, 2 3 4 5, 6, 7
Value 1 0.6 0.4 0.2
Table 2: EFX does not imply MMAX in general.
The Existence of MMAX Allocations. First, note that for two agents, MMAX is equivalent to
EFX and thus exists for general subadditive valuations [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. Indeed,
following exactly the same analysis as in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.1 When there are at most three agents having strictly increasing subadditive valu-
ations, or any number of agents having identical strictly increasing subadditive valuations, an
MMAX allocation exists.
6 Computing Allocations Efficiently
In this section, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an allocation such that
when all agents have additive valuations every agent is either 12 -MMA or MMAX. Moreover, the
allocation our algorithm outputs is 12 -EFX when all agents have subadditive valuations.
Outline of Algorithm. In each round (each while loop of Algorithm 2), we assign at most one
good to each agent that is not envied by any other agent. The assignment of goods to agents
in each round is given by a maximum weight matching between the unenvied agents L and the
unallocated goods R, where the weight of every edge is given by the marginal increase in the
value, after allocating the good to the corresponding agent. If all edges between L and R have
weight 0, we assign goods to unenvied agents according to some maximum cardinality matching.
Observe that the set of unenvied agents may change after each round, e.g., after getting one more
good, an unenvied agent may become envied by some other agents. We repeat the procedure until
all goods are allocated. To make sure that there is always an agent not envied by any other agent,
we use the approach (procedure P in the following) introduced in [Lipton et al., 2004], which is
now widely used in the resource allocation literature.
Procedure P. Given an allocation A, we define its corresponding envy-graph G as follows.
Every agent is represented by a node in G and there is a directed edge from node i to node j iff
vi(Ai) < vi(Aj), i.e., i is envies j. A directed cycle in G is called an envy-cycle. Let C = i1 →
i2 → · · · → it → i1 be such a cycle. If we reallocate Aik+1 to agent ik for all k ∈ [t − 1], and
reallocate Ai1 to agent it, the number of edges of G will be strictly decreased. Thus, by repeatedly
using this procedure, we eventually get another allocation whose envy-graph is acyclic. It is shown
in [Lipton et al., 2004] that P can be done in time O(mn3).
Next, we prove the following main result of this section.
Theorem 6.1 Algorithm 2 computes an allocation in polynomial time that is (1) 12 -EFX and EF1
when all agents have subadditive valuations; (2) either 12 -MMA or exact MMAX for each agent
when the valuations are additive.
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Algorithm 2 The Algorithm for Additive (or Subadditive) Valuations
1: Initiate L = N and R = M .
2: Initiate Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
3: while R 6= ∅ do
4: Compute a maximum weight matching M between L and R, where the weight of edge
between i ∈ L and j ∈ R is given by vi(Ai ∪ {j}) − vi(Ai). If all edges have weight 0,
then we compute a maximum cardinality matchingM instead.
5: For every edge (i, j) ∈ M, allocate j to i: Ai = Ai ∪ {j} and exclude j from R: R =
R \ {j}.
6: As long as there is an envy-cycle with respect to A = (Ai)i∈N , invoke procedure P (to be
described later).
7: Update A = (Ai)i∈N to be the allocations after P.
8: Update the set of agents not envied by any other agents: L = {i ∈ N : ∀j ∈ N, vj(Aj) ≥
vj(Ai)}.
9: end while
Proof: We first show that Algorithm 2 is well defined. In each round, there must be at least one
agent who is not envied by anybody, since after Step 6, the envy-graph is acyclic. Thus there will
be at least one agent whose in-degree is 0, i.e., L 6= ∅. Moreover, since at least one good will be
allocated in each round (each while loop), Algorithm 2 terminates in at most m rounds. Given
that each round (including procedure P, the computation of maximum weight matching, and the
updates of edge weights and unenvied agents L) can be done in polynomial time, Algorithm 2
runs in polynomial time.
Fix any agent i. We classify other agents into three sets:
• agents not envied by i: N1 = {j ∈ N \ {i} : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)};
• agents envied by i that receive only one good: N2 = {j ∈ N\{i} : vi(Ai) < vi(Aj) and |Aj | =
1};
• agents envied by i that receive more than one good: N3 = {j ∈ N \ {i} : vi(Ai) <
vi(Aj) and |Aj | ≥ 2}.
By definition we have N1 ∪N2 ∪N3 = N \ {i}.
We first show that the final allocation A is 12 -EFX and EF1when the valuations are subadditive.
Note that it suffices to consider N3, as the other agents are either not envied by i, or allocated only
one good.
Fix any agent j ∈ N3. Let ej be the last good allocated to j. As we only allocate goods to
unenvied agents, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {ej}), which implies that agent i is satisfied with
respect to EF1. On the other hand, we also have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(ej), since otherwise in the first
round, matching ej (which is not allocated yet) with i (which is not envied) gives a matching with
strictly larger weight. Combing the two inequalities and by subadditivity of valuation vi, we have
2 · vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {ej}) + vi(ej) ≥ vi(Aj),
which implies that agent i is satisfied with respect to 12 -EF, and
1
2 -EFX.
Finally, we show that when the valuations are additive, agent i is also satisfied with respect to
1
2 -MMA or MMAX.
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The case when N2 = N \ {i}, i.e., all other agents receive one good and is envied by agent i,
is trivial: by removing any good e from A−i, there is always some agent with no good. Thus we
have
MMSi(A−i \ {e}, n − 1) = 0 ≤ vi(Ai),
which implies that agent i is also satisfied with respect to MMAX.
Now suppose thatN2 6= N \{i}. In other words, we haveN1∪N3 6= ∅, and n−1−|N2| ≥ 1.
We prove that in this case we have MMSi(A−i, n− 1) ≤ 2 · vi(Ai), which implies that agent i is
satisfied with respect to 12 -MMA.
We first prove that MMSi(A−i, n − 1) is at most the average value of bundles allocated to
agents in N1 ∪N3:
MMSi(A−i, n − 1) ≤
∑
j∈N1
vi(Aj) +
∑
j∈N3
vi(Aj)
n− 1− |N2|
.
Let τ = MMSi(A−i, n− 1). Observe that if we have vi(e) ≤ τ for every e ∈ A−i, then
∑
j∈N1
vi(Aj) +
∑
j∈N3
vi(Aj) = vi(M)−
∑
j∈N2
vi(Aj)
≥vi(M)− |N2| · τ ≥ (n− 1− |N2|) ·MMSi(A−i, n− 1).
Indeed, the assumption is w.l.o.g., since otherwise we can reset every vi(e) to min{τ, vi(e)},
which does not change MMSi(A−i, n − 1). The reason is, in any partitioning of A−i into n − 1
bundles, the bundle with minimum value (whose value is at most τ = MMSi(A−i, n − 1)) is not
touched.
As we have shown before (for subadditive valuations), for every j ∈ N3, we have vi(Aj) ≤
2 · vi(Ai). Since we have vi(Aj) ≤ vi(Ai) for all j ∈ N1, we conclude that
MMSi(A−i, n− 1) ≤ 2 · vi(Ai),
which implies that agent i is satisfied with respect to 12 -MMA. 
Remark. For additive valuations, by Theorem 6.1, the algorithm returns a 12 -MMAX alloca-
tion in general. Actually, by the proof of Theorem 6.1, it is not difficult to see that the returned
allocation is
• 12 -MMA if at least two agents receive more than one good;
• 12 -MMAX if exactly one agent receives more than one good;
• MMAX, otherwise.
Similarly, when the valuations are subadditive, we are able to show that the allocation is 12 -EF,
when at least two agents receive more than one good; 12 -EFX, when exactly one agent receives
more than one good; and EFX, otherwise.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel fairness notions MMA and its two relaxations MMA1 and
MMAX in an unaware environment. We study their connections with other fairness notations,
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and propose an efficient algorithm for computing allocations that is (approximately) MMA and
MMAX.
We leave the existence of MMA1 and MMAX allocations for the broader class of valuations as
a future direction. Another promising direction would be to extend our work to other preference
representations, including ordinal preferences, or to chores instead of goods. Finally, it will be
interesting to obtain analogues concepts for asymmetric agents, where agents may have different
entitlements or shares.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Haris Aziz and David Parkes or reading a draft of this paper and for helpful
discussions. This work is partially supported by NSF CAREER Award No. 1553385.
References
[Abebe et al., 2017] Abebe, R., Kleinberg, J., and Parkes, D. C. (2017). Fair division via social
comparison. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems, pages 281–289. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems.
[Aziz et al., 2018] Aziz, H., Bouveret, S., Caragiannis, I., Giagkousi, I., and Lang, J. (2018).
Knowledge, fairness, and social constraints. In Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence.
[Barman et al., 2018] Barman, S., Biswas, A., Krishnamurthy, S. K., and Narahari, Y. (2018).
Groupwise maximin fair allocation of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[Bei et al., 2017] Bei, X., Qiao, Y., and Zhang, S. (2017). Networked fairness in cake cutting. In
Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 3632–
3638. AAAI Press.
[Biswas and Barman, 2018] Biswas, A. and Barman, S. (2018). Fair division under cardinality
constraints. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 91–97.
[Bouveret et al., 2017] Bouveret, S., Cechla´rova´, K., Elkind, E., Igarashi, A., and Peters, D.
(2017). Fair division of a graph. In 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence.
[Budish, 2011] Budish, E. (2011). The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate com-
petitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103.
[Caragiannis et al., 2016] Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N.,
and Wang, J. (2016). The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare. In Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 305–322. ACM.
16
[Ferraioli et al., 2014] Ferraioli, D., Gourve`s, L., and Monnot, J. (2014). On regular and approx-
imately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the 2014 international confer-
ence on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, pages 997–1004. International Founda-
tion for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[Foley, 1967] Foley, D. K. (1967). An improved envy-free cake cutting protocol for four agents.
Yale Economics Essays, pages 45–98.
[Kurokawa et al., 2018] Kurokawa, D., Procaccia, A. D., andWang, J. (2018). Fair enough: Guar-
anteeing approximate maximin shares. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 65(2):8.
[Lipton et al., 2004] Lipton, R. J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., and Saberi, A. (2004). On approx-
imately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on
Electronic commerce, pages 125–131. ACM.
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] Plaut, B. and Roughgarden, T. (2018). Almost envy-freeness with
general valuations. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, pages 2584–2603. SIAM.
17
